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Abstract 
The introduction of the ODA Charter in 1992 can be seen as Japan’s official pledge to 
pay more attention to political conditions in recipient countries and to impose political 
conditionalities on them. However, in practice, the Japanese government has continued 
using foreign aid as a diplomatic tool to pursue own economic interests. In this paper, in 
order to determine the quality of Japanese foreign aid, Japan’s ODA will be compared 
with the foreign aid of other countries. In term of quantity, the amount of Japan’s ODA is 
impressive. In 1989, Japan topped the US as the biggest donor of foreign aid among all 
aid donor countries. Despite the impressive quantity of Japanese foreign aid, the ratio of 
Japan’s ODA to GNP in 1999 was 0.27 percent, which was lower than the average ODA 
ratio to GNP among DAC members (0.39 percent). Denmark was the country with the 
highest ratio (1.06 percent) followed by the Netherlands (0.82 percent). In term of 
geographical distribution, a prominent characteristic of Japan’s ODA is that Asia, 
especially East Asian countries, receives the biggest share of Japanese aid. Far East Asia 
received 54.5 percent of this amount, and South and Centra Asia received 19.2 percent. 
African countries in South of the Sahara were left far behind receiving only 9.5 percent of 
total Japanese bilateral aid, while the African countries in North of the Sahara received 
only 2.1 percent. Furthermore, Grant Share (GS) of Japan’s ODA was 39.6 percent, 
while the DAC’s average rate of GS that year was 77.8 percent. Among DAC members, 
the Scandinavian countries, Australia and New Zealand had a very high GS, almost 100 
percent. Germany’s and France’s GS were nearly 80 percent. These figures show that 
Japan’s GS has been one of the lowest among DAC members. Also, Japan’s untied aid 
ratio became one of the highest of the DAC 
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1. Introduction   
The introduction of the ODA Charter in 1992 is seen as Japan’s official pledge to pay 
more attention to political conditions in recipient countries and to impose political 
conditionalities on them (Furuoka, 2006, 2007a). However, there is still scepticism about 
Japan’s real intentions. In the new aid guidelines, the promotion of “universal values”, 
such as human rights, democracy and freedom are set to become the new principles of 
Japan’s aid policy. In this connection, a number of questions arise: has Japan placed those 
values in the central theme of its foreign aid policy?  
 
Or, has Japan been using a convenient tactic to create the impression of the willingness to 
promote “universal values”, while in practice the Japanese government has continued 
using foreign aid as a diplomatic tool to pursue her own economic interests? Before 
examining Japan’s aid policy, a detailed analysis of Japan’s ODA flows is necessary. In 
this paper, in order to determine the quality of Japanese foreign aid, Japan’s ODA will be 
compared with the foreign aid of other countries. 
 
2. Quality of foreign aid and its criticism 
The Japanese government makes considerable efforts to maintain Japan’s position as a 
leading donor of foreign aid. However, the quality of Japanese aid is often criticised. 
Some critics maintain that Japan’s ODA is used not so much to help developing countries 
as to advance Japan’s own economic interests.  
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A specialist on Japan’s ODA, Kazuo Sumi (1990: 7-8), agrees with the negative 
assessments of the quality of Japanese foreign aid. Sumi points out that the government 
has repeatedly stressed the humanitarian aspects of foreign aid. However, in reality, the 
allocations of the bigger part of Japan’s ODA are motivated by commercial interests so 
that Japanese foreign aid induces profits for Japanese companies.   
 
The Japanese government refutes these criticisms by maintaining that it has its own 
approach to aid giving. According to a white paper on Japan’s foreign aid, Japan’s ODA 
1991, “Accusations that Japan’s ODA loans are commercially motivated or constitute aid 
with strings attached are groundless”. The document demands a better recognition of the 
usefulness of ODA loans and insists that Japan’s aid provides much needed funds for 
development and that many countries are capable of meeting repayment obligations 
(MOFA, 1991: 48-49).    
      
There are different criteria to gauge the quality of foreign aid, though some indicators 
used to measure the quality of aid can be misleading. There is little argument that Japan 
has made some progress in the direction of improving her foreign aid quality.  
 
As Kusano and Watanabe note, the quality of Japan’s ODA has considerably improved in 
terms of the untied loans ratio.1 This happened after Japanese companies had gained an 
international competitive edge and the government did not need to protect them any 
longer (Kusano and Watanabe, 1997: 15). 
                                                          
1 The ratio of untied loans is the share of untied loans in the total bilateral loan. The ratio is used to measure 
the desirability of aid. Tied loans are less desirable because the money has to be spent on the purchase of 
goods and services from the donor country.   
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Japan is not the only donor country whose aid policy has been partially motivated by her 
own economic interests; many other donors tie their foreign aid. Arase (1995: 2-3) 
claims, “The basic point is that donors have economic and commercial interests besides 
the simple export of goods and services that is the objective of tied aid procurement.  
 
Non-tied ODA schemes can still serve a donor’s interest in access to vital energy, food, 
and resource supplies in the developing world (Furuoka, 2006). In order to examine the 
main characteristics of Japanese foreign aid, the following section will compare Japan’s -
ODA with other donors’ foreign aid.   
 
3. The Amount of Japan’s ODA  
The amount of Japan’s ODA is impressive. In 1989, Japan topped the US as the biggest 
donor of foreign aid, though in the following year the US regained the position. In 1991, 
Japan once again became the biggest donor of foreign aid and remained such for ten 
consecutive years (1991-2000). This position was lost to the US in 2001, when total ODA 
given by Japan was the second to the ODA provided by the US (see Figure 1). 2  
                                                          
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s ODA Annual Report, various issues.  
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Figure 1 Amounts of US and Japan’s ODA (1987-2001)  
Source: MOFA, Japan’s ODA Annual Report, various issues 
 
The fact that Japan could maintain the top donor’s position for several years did not mean 
that there had been no “aid fatigue”. For instance, the amount of Japan’s ODA decreased 
from US$14.70 billion in 1995 to US$9.58 billion in 1996.  A Japanese aid specialist 
described this decrease as a sign of aid fatigue. According to him, due to the prolonged 
economic recession in Japan, the government made budget cuts, and “the budget for 
foreign aid is not an exception” (Kohama, 1997: 21).        
 
The government cut its ODA expenses by 17.9 percent and 15.1 percent in 1999 and 
2000, respectively. As a result, Japan’s ODA declined from US$15.32 billion in 1999 to 
US$13.06 billion in 2000. By contrast, the second biggest donor of foreign aid, the US, 
increased its foreign aid from US$9.14 in 1999 to US$9.50 in 2000. Similarly to Japan’s 
ODA, the total amount of foreign aid provided by DAC decreased from US$ 56.44 
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billion in 1999 to US$53.05 billion in 2000. This decline could be explained by the cut of 
ODA expenses by two leading aid donors, Japan and France.3          
 
4. ODA Ratio to GNP 
An important criterion to gauge the donor country’s efforts to increase the amount of 
foreign is the ratio of the country’s ODA to its GNP, or the share of ODA in the donor 
country’s total GNP. Apparently, an aid donor with a bigger economy or GNP can afford 
to give larger amounts of ODA than aid donors with a smaller economy. 
 
Despite the impressive quantity of Japanese foreign aid, the ratio of Japan’s ODA to GNP 
in 1999 was 0.27 percent, which was lower than the average ODA ratio to GNP among 
DAC members (0.39 percent). Denmark was the country with the highest ratio (1.06 
percent) followed by the Netherlands (0.82 percent).4
 
The Japanese government promised to increase the ratio of the country’s ODA to its 
GNP. As Japan’s ODA 1993 stated, “Japan plans to steadily improve its performance in 
meeting the other target – the ratio of its ODA spending to GNP – under the fifth ODA 
target”5  (MOFA, 1993: 17). However, the government failed to achieve this aim. In 
1992, Japan’s ODA ratio to GNP was 0.33 percent. It increased only slightly to 0.35 
percent in 1998.6
                                                          
3 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Net Official Development Assistance Flow in 
2000, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
4 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Net Official Development Assistance Flow in 
2000, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/  
5 The Target covered the years 1993-1998. 
6 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Net Official Development Assistance Flow in 
2000, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/  
 6
It is possible that the plan to improve the ratio was not fulfilled because Japan set this 
objective reactively rather than voluntarily. This can be assumed from the following 
statement in Japan’s ODA 1993, “The ODA ratio to GNP is used by the international 
community as a yardstick for measuring burden sharing of different countries. Therefore, 
we (the Japanese government) have to make further improvements in this area … 
sufficient to impress upon the international community that indeed, we are fulfilling our 
responsibility in terms of both absolute amount and ODA ratio to GNP” (MOFA, 1993a: 
17).       
 
5. Geographical Distribution of Japan’s ODA 
A prominent characteristic of Japan’s ODA is that Asia, especially East Asian countries, 
receives the biggest share of Japanese aid. In 1998-1999, Japanese bilateral foreign aid 
amounted to US$11.01 billion. Far East Asia received 54.5 percent of this amount, and 
South and Central Asia received 19.2 percent. African countries in South of the Sahara 
were left far behind (Furuoka, 2007b), receiving only 9.5 percent of total Japanese 
bilateral aid. The African countries in North of the Sahara received only 2.1 percent.7
 
To compare, the US distributed its bilateral foreign aid all over the world more evenly. In 
1998-1999, US bilateral foreign aid amounted to US$4.11 billion of which African 
countries North of the Sahara received the highest share (18.3 percent) followed by those 
countries South of the Sahara (17.6 percent). Far East Asia received only 7.8 percent of 
                                                          
7 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Major Recipients of Individual DAC 
Member’s Aid, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
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US bilateral aid and South and Central Asia received 12.9 percent.8
 
Similar to the US, other donors gave more foreign aid to African countries. For example, 
one of the leading aid donors, France, distributed a total of US$4.25 billion in bilateral 
aid in 1998-1999. African countries were the biggest recipients of France’s aid. African 
countries South of the Sahara received 45.4 percent of the total French bilateral aid and 
those countries North of the Sahara received 17.4 percent. 9  
 
As another example, in 1998-1999, German bilateral aid amounted to US$3.75 billion. 
Again, African countries South of the Sahara were the biggest recipients of aid with a 
share of the total German bilateral aid of 26.8 percent.10      
 
6. Grant Share (GS) and Grant Element (GE) 
Regarding the quality of foreign aid, bilateral grants are generally considered more 
favourable for aid recipients than bilateral loans because grants do not require 
reimbursement. In other words, if the share of grants - Grant Share (GS) - in the total 
ODA is higher, the quality of foreign aid is better.11
 
In 1997, GS of Japan’s ODA was 39.6 percent, while the DAC’s average rate of GS that 
year was 77.8 percent. Among DAC members, the Scandinavian countries, Australia and 
                                                          
8 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Major Recipients of Individual DAC 
Member’s Aid, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
9 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Major Recipients of Individual DAC 
Member’s Aid, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
10 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Major Recipients of Individual DAC 
Member’s Aid, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
11 The majority of Japan’s bilateral grants are “tied grants” for which Japanese companies provide goods 
and services.     
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New Zealand had a very high GS, almost 100 percent. Germany’s and France’s GS were 
nearly 80 percent. These figures show that Japan’s GS has been one of the lowest among 
DAC members.12
  
Another indicator of aid quality is the “Grant Element (GE)” which measures the quality 
of foreign aid in terms of interest rate, grace period and maturity. A higher GE ratio in the 
country’s foreign aid indicates a better quality aid. A lower ratio of GE in the total ODA 
makes aid less desirable for recipient countries (Furuoka, 2006).    
  
The GE of Japan’s ODA in 1997 was 78.6 percent and one of the lowest of the DAC. 
Australia and New Zealand give only grants - and no aid loans. Therefore, their GE is 
usually 100 percent. Foreign aid by Norway, Sweden and Finland also has almost 100 
percent GE.13  
  
Kusano (1997: 99) mentions that the DAC criticised the low GS and GE of Japan’s ODA 
and urged the Japanese government to improve the condition of foreign aid by providing 
more bilateral grants. The Japanese government insists that low GS and GE do not mean 
that contributions bring comparatively little benefit to recipient countries. For example, 
the absolute value of Japan’s grants in 1994 was US$8.98 billion; this amount surpassed 
total ODA by France (MOFA, 1996: 24). 
  
 
                                                          
12  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s ODA 1999, from the MOFA’s Internet Homepage 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ov1_1.html
13  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s ODA 1999, from the MOFA’s Internet Homepage 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ov1_1.html
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Kohama (1997: 27) disputes the view that grants are better than loans. He claims that aid 
recipients tend to waste bilateral grants which they consider “free gifts” while they spend 
bilateral loans more cautiously because bilateral loans require repayment.  
 
In a similar vein, Kusano (1997: 92) reminds that by providing bilateral loans, as opposed 
to bilateral grants, Japan exercises aid philosophy that stresses the spirit of “self-help” by 
aid recipients.  
 
7. Ratio of Untied Aid  
Another important criterion for the quality of foreign aid is the ratio of untied aid. While 
tied aid means that loans or grants have to be spent on the purchase of the donor’s goods 
and services, untied aid does not have such conditions (Todaro, 2000: 591). Untied aid is 
more favourable for the recipient countries than tied aid because the latter tends to be 
commercially motivated and promotes the donor’s interests by depriving local business 
of the chance to provide goods and services for aid programs.  
 
However, the ratio of untied aid does not always indicate the absence of commercial 
interest in a donor’s aid program. The French government provides foreign aid to teach 
the French language and though this aid is classified as tied aid, it is not commercial. On 
the other hand, a donor can manipulate the bidding procedure for untied aid to ensure the 
desired outcome (Arase, 1995: 2-3). 
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The Japanese government has been making efforts to increase the amounts of untied aid. 
According to Japan’s ODA 1997, “Since the Japanese government announced its position 
in the Japan-U.S. joint communiqué in 1978, the untied portion (of Japanese ODA) has 
increased steadily” (MOFA, 1997a: 103). Subsequently, Japan’s untied aid ratio became 
one of the highest of the DAC (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1   Average Untied Aid Ratio of DAC Members (1995-1999) 
 
Over 90% 50% - 90% 25% - 50% Under 25% No data 
Japan Norway Canada Belgium Greece 
Sweden Portugal Italy Spain Ireland 
Switzerland Netherlands Australia US Luxembourg 
 Germany UK  New 
Zealand 
 Finland France   
 Denmark Austria   
 
Source: OECD14  
 
Though the Japanese government has done a good job and increased the ratio of untied 
aid in Japan’s ODA, apparently, it prefers to give untied loans rather than untied grants. 
In 1996, 100 percent of Japanese loans were untied loans, while only 47.6 percent of 
grants were untied.15  
 
                                                          
14 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Major Recipients of Individual DAC 
Member’s Aid, from the OECD’s Internet Homepage http://www.oecd.org/
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Position on Untied Aid, from the MOFA’s Internet Homepage 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/japan/opinion/iimura.html   
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Watanabe and Kusano (1997: 16-17) point out that Japan is not the only donor country 
with a higher share of tied grants in the total amount of grants, and other aid donors also 
provide tied grants.      
 
Watanabe and Kusano (1997: 15) state that although Japan’s ODA has been criticized for 
protecting the interests of Japanese companies the reality is misinterpreted. They argue 
that after Japanese companies acquired the needed competitiveness with international 
companies, the government stopped favouring Japanese firms and began to give contracts 
to foreign companies. As a result, the untied loans ratio of Japan’s foreign aid increased.  
 
MOFA’s attempts to increase the ratio of untied aid met strong opposition from MITI. 
Apparently, there is an inter-ministry conflict between MOFA, that supports an untied aid 
policy, and MITI, that prefers giving tied aid. Japanese companies and MITI strongly 
object to MOFA’s “General Untied Aid Policy” which aims to improve the quality of aid 
(Furuoka, 2007).  
 
 The Japan Economic Institute Report states that MITI actively promotes tied foreign aid. 
For example, a MITI-related council recommends that “more tied aid should be 
considered within OECD rules in order to promote economic co-operation using our 
(Japanese) technology”. MOFA strongly opposes this idea (Japan Economic Institute 
Report, July 11, 1997).  
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According to the Report, “This proposal drew fire from the Foreign Ministry on the 
grounds that increasing tied aid not only would trigger a backlash in the international 
community but also would reverse the direction of the post-1988 reform of Japan’s ODA 
program” (Japan Economic Institute Report, July 11, 1997).  
 
Orr (1993: 45) argues that MITI has been reluctant to increase untied aid because it is 
aware that Japan’s commercial interests would suffer. However, there exists another 
obstacle of a different nature. According to Orr, after MITI had finally agreed to allow 
developing countries to join international tenders to bid for aid procurements for untied 
aid, developing countries could not win the bid because they either had not enough 
expertise or were unable to provide cheaper goods of better quality. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The introduction of the ODA Charter in 1992 can be seen as Japan’s official pledge to 
pay more attention to political conditions in recipient countries and to impose political 
conditionalities on them. However, in practice, the Japanese government has continued 
using foreign aid as a diplomatic tool to pursue own economic interests. In this paper, in 
order to determine the quality of Japanese foreign aid, Japan’s ODA will be compared 
with the foreign aid of other countries.  
 
In term of quantity, the amount of Japan’s ODA is impressive. In 1989, Japan topped the 
US as the biggest donor of foreign aid among all aid donor countries. Despite the 
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impressive quantity of Japanese foreign aid, the ratio of Japan’s ODA to GNP in 1999 
was 0.27 percent, which was lower than the average ODA ratio to GNP among DAC 
members (0.39 percent). Denmark was the country with the highest ratio (1.06 percent) 
followed by the Netherlands (0.82 percent).  
 
In term of geographical distribution, a prominent characteristic of Japan’s ODA is that 
Asia, especially East Asian countries, receives the biggest share of Japanese aid. Far East 
Asia received 54.5 percent of this amount, and South and Centra Asia received 19.2 
percent. African countries in the South of the Sahara were left far behind receiving only 
9.5 percent of total Japanese bilateral aid, while the African countries in the North of the 
Sahara received only 2.1 percent.  
 
Furthermore, Grant Share (GS) of Japan’s ODA was 39.6 percent, while the DAC’s 
average rate of GS that year was 77.8 percent. Among DAC members, the Scandinavian 
countries, Australia and New Zealand had a very high GS, almost 100 percent. 
Germany’s and France’s GS were nearly 80 percent. These figures show that Japan’s GS 
has been one of the lowest among DAC members. Also, Japan’s untied aid ratio became 
one of the highest of the DAC 
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